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INTRODUCTION
With the new millennium upon us, the time has come to eval-
uate the environmental goals of the past and the success of fol-
lowing those plans through to completion. .Through this type of
analysis, improvements can be made in future efforts by adopting
more realistic and effective goals.
This Note argues that many of the failures in the international
environmental movement have been due to the idealistic goals
set for developing nations that are unable to achieve these
heights. In particular, this Note provides an analysis on Mexico
and its failure to comply with the goals set by the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), estab-
lished in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro.1
For the past fifteen years, Mexico has tried to balance its eco-
nomic needs with its desire to become a player in the interna-
tional market. Coupled with these demands on the Mexican gov-
ernment, the geography of the nation makes it difficult to build
without severely affecting the environment. In addition to the
constant threat of earthquakes and other natural disasters, Mex-
ico is confronted with scarce fresh water resources in the north,
poor water quality in the central and southeast region, deforesta-
tion, and massive widespread erosion along the U.S./Mexico bor-
* J.D. Candidate, 2000 Fordham University School of Law. The au-
thor wishes to thank her family and her husband for their support.
1. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONE151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). See
also T.M.C. ASSER INSTITUUT, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12-14
(1997).
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der.2 Further, for years, Mexico City and other urban develop-
ments along the U.S./Mexico border have been targeted as
serious air pollution areas. 3 This environmental vulnerability
makes Mexico a prime candidate for environmental regulation,
but at what cost to the local people and their economy?
This Note argues that the goals set by the UNCED are unrea-
sonable for a developing nation, such as Mexico, without outside
financial and technological support from industrialized nations.
Part I of this Note will examine the history of Mexico's environ-
mental effort and the conflicting priorities of the environment
and the economy in Mexico. In Part II, this Note will review the
UNCED, and a discussion will follow about the Agenda 21 Com-
mitments and the goals set in Rio. Part III will analyze Mexico's
response to the UNCED and critique Mexico's adherence to the
commitments. Part III will further examine Mexico's frustration
with the UNCED, particularly the financial considerations it faces
and its refusal to attend the 5-year review in 1997. Finally, in Part
IV, some realistic alternatives are presented that attempt to
bridge Mexico's economic vulnerability with its environmental
needs.
I. MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORT AND EFFECTS ON ITS
ECONOMIC SITUATION
A. Overview of Mexico's Environmental Effort
According to customary international law, a nation has exclu-
sive and absolute right to use and exploit its own natural re-
sources. 4 Regardless of this traditional hands-off view, environ-
2. See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BooK,
MExICO 308 (1997) [hereinafter THE WORLD FACT BOOK].
3. See id.
4. See Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
See also The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONE151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Principle 2 of the Rio Declara-
tion sets out the principle of national sovereignty as follows:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
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mental needs have sped to the front of many national agendas,
including Mexico's. Mexico has maintained federal legislation to
address environmental problems. 5 In addition, Article 73 of the
Mexican Constitution grants the federal government the power
to protect public health by protecting the environment. 6
To further this environmental agenda, Mexico has entered
into several bilateral and multilateral international agreements
addressing environmental issues such as the 1985 Vienna Con-
vention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.7 Moreover, Mex-
ico is a party to several international conventions for the preven-
their own environmental and developmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
5. See generally Charles T DuMars & Salvador Beltran Del Rio M., A
Survey of the Air and Water Quality Laws of Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J.
787 (1988) [hereinafter DuMars & Del Rio] (discussing Mexico's envi-
ronmental legislation and constitutional provisions).
6. MEXICAN [Constitution] art. 73, XXIX (Mex.). Congress has the
power [tlo levy taxes:
1. On foreign commerce;
2. On the utilization and exploitation of natural resources ...
3. On institutions of credit and insurance companies.
4. On public services under concession or operated directly by the
Federation, and
5. On the following, as special taxes:
a. Electric power.
b. Production and consumption of processed tobacco.
c. Gasoline and other products derived from petroleum.
d. Matches and cerillos.
e. Maguey and its fermented products.
f. Forestry exploitation, and
g. Production and consumption of beer.
Article 73 further establishes that the Congress shall have the
power "[t]o expedite laws that establish the concurrence of Federal
Government, of the governments of the States and of the municipali-
ties, in the areas of their respective competencies, as regards to envi-
ronment protection of the preservation and restoration of the ecologi-
cal balance." Id. at XXIX-G.
7. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar.
22, 1995, 26 I.L.M. 1516.
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tion of marine pollution. 8 In the early nineties, Mexico signed
and ratified the Basel Convention on the Control of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposals requiring exporting nations to pro-
vide advance notice and receive consent from the receiving na-
tion for proposed waste shipments.9
Mexico has also signed and ratified several bilateral agree-
ments with the United States. Among the most noteworthy is the
Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers of the Rio Grande, also known as the Water Treaty of
1944.10 Another vital treaty is the 1983 Agreement between the
United States and Mexico on Cooperation for the Protection and
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area."
In order to enforce its environmental priorities both interna-
tionally and domestically, Mexico adopted the General Law of
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection, which be-
came effective March 1, 1988.12 The Secretariat of Ecology and
Urban Development of Mexico, also called SEDUE, was the ma-
jor enforcement body of the General Ecology Law. 3
8. See generally The Convention for the Protection and Develop-
ment of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
March 24, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 221; The International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973);
The 1972 Convention on Prevention of the Marine Pollution by Dump-
ing of Wastes and Other Matter, Feb. 16, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546; The
Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 13,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 1291.
9. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/WG.190/4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
10. Water Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S. - Mexico, 28 U.S.T.
7399 (1944).
11. 1983 Agreement between the United States and Mexico on Co-
operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10827, 22 I.L.M. 1025.
12. General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection, art. 8 (V) (1988) (Mex.) [hereinafter called General Ecol-
ogy Law]. English translation found in, MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL Docu-
MENTS, August 1991, (unpublished documents), provided by the World
Environmental Center.
13. See General Ecology Law, supra note 12, art. 8(V).
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The General Ecology Law was enforced by SEDUE, with the
use of Technical Ecological Norms (Normas Tecnicas Ecologicas
or "NTE"), regulations that establish ecological standards, in-
cluding tests and procedures.' 4 Activities, both public and pri-
vate, that threaten to exceed the limits provided in the relevant
NTE require an environmental impact evaluation. 5 This environ-
mental impact statement must provide assessments of risk for
proposed activities and preventative or corrective measures to al-
leviate the adverse environmental impacts. 6
Through the General Ecology Law, Mexico attempted to con-
front several environmental issues on a federal level. For exam-
ple, SEDUE had authority to issue NTE's to control, reduce, or
avoid air pollution.'" Further, the General Ecology Law encour-
ages the rational use of water sources in a manner that preserves
and protects aquatic ecosystems.' 8 Ecological criteria for soil pro-
tection programs are provided, and the development of a na-
tional land system is authorized. 9 The General Ecology Law also
provides for the designation of protected natural areas within the
Mexican territory to aid in the protection of endangered species
and habitats.20 Finally, under the General Ecology Law, SEDUE
attempted to limit hazardous activities to designated areas.2'
Mexico has responded to the need for environmental regula-
tion, through the General Ecology Law and International Agree-
ments; however, a major hurdle remains with the implementa-
tion of these laws. Under the General Ecology Law, Mexico's
environmental laws are enforced through inspection and over-
sight procedures.22 Failure to comply can result in administrative
and criminal sanctions. 23 The administrative action ranges from
14. Id. art. 8.
15. See id. arts. 28-35.
16. See id. art. 34.
17. See id. art. 112.
18. Id. art. 88.
19. See id. art. 107.
20. Id. art. 44 (Articles discussing the protection of natural areas
are located in General Ecology Law, Title 2.).
21. Id. arts. 145-49.
22. Id. arts. 161-69.
23. See id. art. 160.
19981
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fines to an administrative arrest of up to thirty-six hours. 24 In
1991, SEDUE began to require firms in non-compliance to put
up bonds equal to the cost of installing pollution abatement
equipment. 25 Further non-compliance could lead to the forfei-
ture of the bond.26
Although the General Ecology Law appears thorough and im-
pressive in form, SEDUE lacked the resources to execute an ef-
fective enforcement program.27 This ineffective plan led to con-
cern across Mexico's northern border. Critics of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) feared that the
Agreement would make it easy for U.S. Companies to relocate
and take advantage of Mexico's poor environmental enforce-
ment.28 Congressman Robert T. Matsui stated that essentially,
what the Agreement now provides is a chance for Mexico to
wink and not enforce its own laws to attract our businesses.2 9 As
a result, serious attention was directed at strengthening the en-
forcement of Mexico's environmental regulations.30
In May 1992, the Mexican Congress passed new legislation re-
ducing the role of the federal environmental authorities. 31
Through this legislation SEDUE was transformed to the Secreta-
24. See id. arts. 171-75.
25. See Companies Face New Environmental Scrutiny, Bus. Int'l; Bus.
Latin Am., Nov. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Intlaw, North/South
America, Mexico.
26. See id.
27. See Maryanne Foronjy, Note, Mexico and the North American Free
Trade Agreement Growing Clean?, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 211, 228
(1993) (citing Interagency Task Force, Review of U.S.-Mexico Environ-
mental Issues, Feb. 1992, at 41).
28. See Douglas A. Levy, Administration Hails Trade Deal's Environ-
mental Provisions, UPI, Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
29. Keith Schneider, Trade Pact vs. Environment: A Clash at the House
Hearing, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at Dl. Congressman Robert T. Mat-
sui is a Democrat from California and member of the Ways and Means
Trade sub-committee.
30. See William A. Orme, Jr., 'Fast-Track' Opponents Can't Hide Behind
a Green Fig Leaf Anymore, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1991, at M2.
31. See Mexico Localizes Environmental Enforcement, Bus. INT'L; INVEST-
ING, LICENSING & TRADING, Oct. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, North/
South America, Mexico.
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riat of Social Development (SEDESOL).32 With this change local
authorities were granted greater power and discretion in inter:
preting and enforcing environmental regulations. 33
In 1994, Mexico's environmental agencies were reformed once
again when President Zedillo established a new Secretariat of En-
vironment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries (SMARNP), which
today has jurisdiction over environmental matters. 34 Normas
Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs), previously referred to as NTEs, are
promulgated by SMARNP and establish the requirements, condi-
tions, and procedures that regulated industries are required to
observe.35 As of 1996, SEMARNAP had developed 206 NOM's for
air emissions, wastewater discharge limitations, and hazardous
waste management. 36
Even with the shift in federal legislation and the interest of the
United States focused on Mexico's environmental enforcement,
the economic situation of Mexico continues to weigh against
strict protection, as discussed in the next section.
B. The Conflict Between the Environment and
the Economy in Mexico
Mexico has a free market economy that combines modern in-
dustry and agriculture.37 Economic activity suffered in 1995 with
the aftermath of the previous year's peso crisis of 1994, when ac-
tivity dropped more than 6%.38 Fortunately, in the comeback
year of 1996, economic activity grew an estimated 5.1%.39 Fueled
32. See SEDUE Re-Emerges Under SEDESOL, BUSINESS MEXICO, Sept.
1992, available in LEXIS, North/South America, Mexico.
33. See Mexico Localizes Environmental Enforcement, supra note 31.
34. See Paulette S. Wolfson et al., Mexican Environmental Regulations:
How They Affect Your Business Decisions, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 48
(1996); See also Armin Rosencranz et al., Rio Plus Five: Environmental Pro-
tection and Free Trade in Latin America, 9 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 527,
540 (1997).
35. See Wolfson, supra note 34.
36. See id. at 49.
37. See THE WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 309.
38. See id. The new peso replaced the old peso on January 1, 1993,
at the rate that 1 new peso would equal 1,000 old pesos. See id. at 310.
39. See id. at 309.
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by increased exports (up about 16% from 1995) Mexican govern-
ment statistics show that increased domestic consumption also
helped lead to recovery.40 Yet, it is still extremely premature to
say that the Mexican economy has overcome its frailty.
Low savings rates have kept Mexico dependent on foreign cap-
ital, as seen by the plunge in the national savings as a share of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 25% in 1983 to less than
14% in 1994. 41 Further, Mexico's trade is still highly dependent
on the U.S. market.42 Due to the devaluation of the peso in 1994,
Mexican exports have grown quickly, leading to a trade deficit
between the U.S. and Mexico, an enormous contrast from the
$1.3 billion trade surplus of 1994. 43
Exports and investments continued to grow through 1996 and
1997; however, in the middle of 1997, real average earnings had
dropped to 20% below their 1994 pre-crisis level." Inflation de-
clined from 28% in December of 1996, but remained high at
18% by the end of 1997. 45 With the unemployment rate at 10%
and underemployment rampant,46 environmental regulations face
an uphill battle for implementation in Mexico.
A prime example of the conflict between environmental priori-
ties and economic needs is seen in the maquiladora zones.47
These zones consist of foreign manufacturers who are allowed to
import materials duty free into Mexico to assemble or manufac-
ture products for re-export to the country of origin, most often
the United States.48
This practice allows the re-entry into the United States of
goods assembled in Mexico from materials originally made in the
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 310.
43. See id.
44. See OECD, Economic Survey of Mexico, February 1998, (visited
11/5/98) <http://www.oecd.org/eco/surv/esu-mex.htm>.
45. See id.
46. See THE WORLD FACT BooI, supra note 2, at 310.
47. See Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 6, 1991, at 32.
48. See Rodolfo Villalobos and Bruce B. Barshop, Social Infrastruc-
ture Needs of the Maquiladora Industry: A Proposal for United States Corporate
Contributions, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J 701, 705 (1991).
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U.S. and only the value added to the raw materials is subject to a
duty.49 As a result, lower manufacturing costs increase the market
for U.S. goods by lowering the cost of goods to the consumer.5 0
In addition to benefiting U.S. corporations, the maquiladora in-
dustries breathe life into the Mexican economy. In the late eight-
ies, the maquiladora industry was one of the fastest growing sec-
tors in the Mexican economy, ahead of tourism and second only
to Mexico's petroleum export in the generation of foreign
exchange.1
Although both the United States and Mexico have benefited
economically from the maquiladoras, the environment of north-
ern Mexico has not fared as well. The maquiladoras are required
to comply with all of Mexico's environmental regulations. 52 How-
ever, Mexico's thirst for economic stability has led to the relaxa-
tion of environmental enforcement in the maquiladora region in
order to lure U.S. industries to the south side of the border. 3 As
a result, thousands of maquiladora industries have thrived by lo-
cating themselves along the U.S./Mexico border where enforce-
ment of environmental regulation is traditionally lax.54
The result has been massive environmental degradation in
these areas. For example, Mexican Law requires that hazardous
waste generated by the maquiladoras be returned and disposed
of in the country of origin. The lack of enforcement in the ma-
quiladora region has resulted in the development of a toxic
wasteland along the border of Mexico and the United States.55
During the NAFTA negotiations, this issue received great atten-
tion by both Mexican and U.S. environmental officials who were
concerned by the high number of children being born with miss-
ing or incomplete brains to women who lived or worked in the
maquiladora region.5 6
49. See id. at 705-06.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 705-06.
52. See id.
53. See Foronjy, supra note 27, at 235.
54. See Satchell, supra note 47.
55. See Foronjy, supra note 27.
56. See id. (citing North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted With
Suspicion By Environmental Groups, INT'L ENVT. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 10,
1998]
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As Mexico and other developing nations continued the strug-
gle to bridge the gap between economic demands and environ-
mental needs, the United Nations stepped forward in 1992 and
initiated a Conference that would attempt to solve international
and cross-border environmental problems without violating na-
tional sovereignty or the right of development. 57 The goals and
successes of this Conference are discussed in Part II of this
paper.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) IN Rio DE JANEIRO
A. Overview of UNCED and Agenda 21
Representatives from 178 national governments met in June of
1992, in Rio de Janeiro, to develop a scheme of international en-
vironmental regulation that would de-compartmentalize environ-
mental protection both nationally and internationally.58 The Con-
ference, also labeled the Earth Summit, was seen by some as a
continuation of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm, which for the first time
brought environmental issues to an international forumn.5 9 Taken
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File).
57. See Rogelio Gonzalez Garcia et al., Climate Change and Environ-
mental Policies in Mexico, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 217, 220 (1992).
58. See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 104 (3d ed.
1996). The UNCED charter declared: "The Conference should elabo-
rate strategies and measure to halt and reverse the effects of environ-
mental degradation in the context of strengthened national and inter-
national efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound
development in all countries." See LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 37
(1994).
59. See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 104-05 (3d
ed. 1996). After the Conference in Stockholm, the United Nations be-
gan to coordinate its environmental activities through the creation of
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). UNEP is not
an executive agency, nor is it capable of carrying out its own programs.
The functioning of the UNEP depends on other national and interna-
tional agencies to implement the programs it helps to design. In 1989,
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together, these two events have forwarded a single message: that
a healthy world environment depends on national environmental
policies being made and enforced with consideration of the na-
ture and scope of their international effects. 60
Three official agreements achieved at the conference were the
Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, 61 a Statement
UNEP encouraged the United Nations General Assembly to create the
UNCED. See LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTI-
ATING MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 37 (1994).
60. See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 104 (3d ed.
1996).
61. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June
13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
874 (1992). The Preamble set out the goal for the Conference in the
following way:
The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development,
Having met at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992,
Reaffirming the Declaration of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm
on 16 June 1972, and seeking to build upon it,
With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global
partnership through creation of new levels of cooperation
among States, key sectors of societies and people,
Working towards international agreements which respect
the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global en-
vironmental and developmental system,
Recognizing that integral and interdependent nature of
the Earth, our home ...
Id. at 876.
The Declaration goes on to introduce twenty-seven principles, the
second of which is an updated version of the famous principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration. The Declaration also contains new ele-
ments, including a statement of the precautionary approach, reference
to a right of development and assertion of an obligation to undertake
environmental impact assessments. Further, the Declaration makes an
affirmation of the desirability of a "supportive and open economic sys-
tem", and a statement that "each individual shall have appropriate ac-
cess to information concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities
in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-
making processes." See id. at 876-80; see also Edith Brown Weiss, Introduc-
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of Forest Principles, 62 and Agenda 21.63 In addition, two treaties,
the Framework Convention on Climate Change64 and the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity,65 were also signed by several na-
tions while at the Conference. These latter two treaties were ne-
gotiated before the Rio Conference; although they were offered
for signature, they were not direct products of the Conference.
66
Although all the agreements that came out of Rio are important
to the environmental movement, Agenda 21 will be the focus of
this discussion.
The most significant aspect to emerge from the UNCED pro-
ceedings in Rio was Agenda 21, a thorough statement of princi-
ples to guide industrialized and developing nations into the
twenty-first century with an emphasis on environmental aware-
ness and sustainable development. 67 In its early stages, Agenda 21
was to be solely a plan of action to lead the world toward sustain-
able development in the next millenium. 6s However, to make this
possibility a reality, the framers of the document sought to add
and develop an agreement on the financial resources needed to
tory Note: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 31
I.L.M. 814 (1992).
62. U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev.: Statement of Principles for a
Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and Sustainable
Dev. of all Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/CONE151/6/Rev.1 (1992), re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992).
63. U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev., Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/6/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]; see also U.N.
GOAR, Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21
para. 4 (advance unedited text, July 1, 1997).
64. U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev.: Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849
(1992).
65. U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev.: Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
66. See id.
67. See CALDWELL, supra note 59, at 110. See also NICHOLAS A.
ROBINSON ET AL., AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS XVI (1992).
Agenda 21 also consists of substantive political recommendations to
protect the environment and promote sustainable development. Id.
68. See LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTI-
ATING MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 37 (1994).
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implement Agenda 21 .69
Before the actual Conference in Rio, in 1991, the UNCED Sec-
retariat established several working groups to draft proposals to
be presented at Rio.70 One of those working groups was desig-
nated the task of developing a legal, financial, and institutional
framework for Agenda 21.71 Upon the completion of drafts by
the workings groups, four preparatory meetings were held with
representative membership drawn from the over 150 delegates
who were to attend the conference in Rio.72
The fourth and final preparatory conference was held in New
York in March of 1992, immediately before the UNCED Confer-
ence was to begin in Rio.73 During that session, the Agenda 21
draft was considered. 74 The group called for a special fund for
the implementation of Agenda 21 that would (1) be in addition
to the official development aid already targeted from developed
countries; (2) require mandatory contributions from developed
countries; (3) give equal voice to all parties in determining pro-
ject selection, eligibility criteria, and release of funds; and (4)
fund activities according to priorities and needs of developing
countries. 75 During the preparatory conference, the present in-
dustrialized nations attacked each of these ideas and provided va-
rying alternatives. 7 6 The Chairperson directed a small group to
meet behind closed doors in order to work out a compromise,
but after two weeks no progress had been made. 7  Consequently,
a draft of Agenda 21 was sent to Rio, but most of the specific fi-
nancial considerations were left to the negotiators at the
69. See id.
70. See NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON ET AL., AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED
PROCEEDINGS XVI (1992).
71. See id.
72. See SUSSKIND, supra note 68, at 38.
73. See ROBINSON, supra note 70.
74. See id.
75. See SUSSKIND, supra note 68, at 39.
76. See id. Among the critics from the industrialized world, the Eu-
ropean Community insisted that only the Global Environmental Facil-
ity, a creation of the World Bank, United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme, and the United Nations Development Programme, had the
authority to allocate funds for the implementation of Agenda 21.
77. See id.
19981
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conference.7"
At Rio, Agenda 21 grew more and more as parties both edited
and added to it. The finished product amounted to almost eight
hundred pages with 40 chapters plus appendices.7 9 However, in
some respects it failed to be the action plan for the twenty-first
century, because it did not list any priorities of action. 0 Instead,
Agenda 21 provided an equitable course of action for achieving
a healthy, sustainable environment around the world, but the ac-
tual implementation of the plan is left to individual
governments.81
B. The Practicality of the Agenda 21 Commitments
Two disheartening statistics triggered the massive concern for
international environmental protection in the next century and
the creation of Agenda 21. By 2050, the current global popula-
tion of almost 6.0 billion will grow to between 7.9 and 11.9 bil-
lion.82 At the same time the world's economy is estimated to
grow four or five times.8 3 These two facts combined have the po-
tential to lead to a huge increase in production, rise in consump-
tion, and massive environmental degradation. A degraded natu-
ral environment will lead to difficulties in several forms. Global
warming could raise ocean levels thereby targeting lands and na-
tions located at sea level,84 while scarce resources could lead to
78. See id.
79. See id at 41.
80. See id.
81. See CALDWELL, supra note 60, at 110. As discussed supra, "States
have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies." Rio Declaration,
supra note 61, at 876. In addition, Principle 11 declares that: "States
shall enact effective legislation. Environmental standards, management
objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and develop-
ment context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to
other countries, in particular developing countries." Id. at 878.
82. See WORLD RESOURCES INST., WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97, at 173
(1996).
83. See WORLD RESOURCES INST., RESOURCES FLOWS: MATERIAL BASIS
OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES iV-V (1997).
84. See John Dernbach, U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments:
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poverty, overcrowding, and violent competitive action.85
Agenda 21 claims that in order to confront and overcome
these possible disasters, the planet must adopt a collective plan
of sustainable development. The Brundtland Commission of 1988
defined sustainable development as development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.8 6 Agenda 21 expands this
definition by setting out a broad plan of action to provide for
sustainable development in all areas of the world based on the
varying situation and needs of the nation in question.87
The preamble to the Agenda 21' draft, which emerged from
the preparatory conferences, and was presented at Rio, best sum-
marizes its hopeful role as follows:
Humanity stands at a defining moment in its history. We are
confronted with a perpetuation of disparities between and
within nations, a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and il-
literacy, and the continuing deterioration of the ecosystems on
which we depend for our well being. However, integration of
environment and development conccrns, and greater attention
to them will lead to fulfillment of basic needs, improved living
standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and
a safer, more prosperous future. No nation can achieve this on
its own; but together we can be in a global partnership for sus-
tainable development.88
The scope of Agenda 21 is extremely vast. In general, the mas-
sive plan is broken into four sections: (1) social and economic
development; (2) conservation and management of resources for
development; (3) strengthening the role of major groups; and
(4) means of implementation.89 Within each of these sections,
chapters further develop the aspirations of the enormous plan.
The social and economic development section includes chapters
on international trade and development, poverty, changes in
A Five-Year Review, 27 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,504 (1997).
85. See id. (citing World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common
Future 43 (1987)).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See ROBINSON, supra note 70, at xxv (citing Doc. A/CONF1.51/
PC/L. 78 of 3 April 1992).
89. See U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev., Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/6/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
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consumption, sustainability based on demographics, promotion
of human health and sustainable human development, and the
integration of the environment with development. 90
In the second section, which covers conservation of resources,
the chapters address: the atmosphere, land resources, deforesta-
tion, desertification, mountain development, agriculture, biologi-
cal diversity, biotechnology, oceans, freshwater resources, toxic
chemicals, hazardous waste, solid waste, and radioactive waste.91
The third section of Agenda 21 identifies how different groups
can become involved in the advancement of sustainable develop-
ment. Among the groups identified are women, youth, indige-
nous people, non-governmental organizations, local authorities,
workers, industry, the scientific community, and farmers.92 Finally
in section four of Agenda 21 proposes a means of implementa-
tion. This plan calls for financial support, transfer of technology,
advancement of science, promotion of education, international
institutional arrangements, international legal mechanisms, and
information for decision-making. 93
An analysis of the enormous scope of Agenda 21 and its practi-
cality would far surpass the bounds of this Note. Therefore, sev-
eral main points of the implementation section will be examined
in depth. In particular, this critique will focus on the general im-
plementation methods, the transfer and advancement of science
and technology, and the financial support required to make the
Agenda 21 goals a reality.
According to Agenda 21, implementation of the plan will vary
between different nations, depending on individual circum-
stances. However, that is the only guidance Agenda 21 provides.
For example, the chapter addressing the management of land re-
sources states that governments at the appropriate level, with the
support of regional and international organizations, should
strengthen regional cooperation and exchange of information
on land resources. 94 Individual governments are also responsible
for determining the level of government that is best to carry out
the commitments of Agenda 21. The only help provided by the
document is a general suggestion that planning and manage-
90. See id. chs. 2-8.
91. See id. chs. 9-22.
92. See id. chs. 23-32.
93. See id. chs. 33-40.
94. See id. para. 10.12.
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ment should take place at the lowest public authority level, be-
cause local governments are more attuned to the environmental
needs of their particular location.95 While this may be true, local
governments are also more knowledgeable about local poverty
and unemployment rates; such problems are likely to' consume
the limited resources of municipalities before the items on the
environmental agenda are met. Furthermore, if regulations are
to be developed based on individual community needs, there is a
risk of townships in a single geographic area having vastly differ-
ent environmental regulations. Air and water pollution does not
remain stagnant; many such problems spread greatly, thus, local-
ized regulation is an inadequate way to confront them.
The goals set by Agenda 21 recognize the importance of sci-
ence and technology in pollution control and sustainable devel-
opment.96 Many developing countries do not have the technol-
ogy, resources, or research facilities necessary to reduce
environmental degradation. 97 Simple technological advances
could have a significant environmental impact in developing
nations.
For example, basic education about crop rotation could lead
to less depletion of soil minerals, less erosion, and therefore less
abandoned farmland. Similarly, advancements in fertilizers could
improve soil conditions, leading to less use of tropical forests for
farmland, thereby reducing deforestation and benefiting local
farmers. Farmers who cut down tropical forests soon learn that
the soil can produce crops for only a few years. The land then
becomes subject to erosion and the farmer must seek new tropi-
cal land to make a living.
By encouraging communication and cooperation among the
scientific and technological community, decision makers, and the
public, 98 Agenda 21 seeks to further sustainability goals, inform
government officials about the benefits and limits of science and
technology, and increase public knowledge and participation.99
95. See id. para. 8.5(g).
96. See id. chs. 31, 35.
97. See generally Latin American Environment in Ruins, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS, March 2, 1997, at 51A; Elliot Diringer, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, June 20, 1997.
98. See Agenda 21, para. 31.1.
99. See Dernbach, supra note 84. Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration
states that, "States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capac-
ity-building for sustainable development by improving scientific under-
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However, this idealistic plan has not fared as well as was
expected.
A major practical consideration not addressed at Rio was the
inhibiting effect of intellectual property law on the transfer of
technology. As of 1994, 105 countries were members of the
Berne Convention, including most major industrialized coun-
tries. 100 The Berne Convention provides international protection
to scientific and other works.10 Thus, the need to share technol-
ogy with developing nations, is weighed against a creator's prop-
erty right to exploit his or her creation. As a result, companies
are slow to share technological secrets.10 2
During the conference at Rio, major discussion surrounded fi-
nancial support from industrialized nations in order to achieve
the goals enumerated in Agenda 21.103 After much debate and
controversy, the final version of Agenda 21 included a commit-
ment by developed countries to provide 0.7 percent of their GNP
as official assistance to developing countries for sustainable devel-
opment and implementation of Agenda 21.104 This commitment
has tremendous implications for developing nations. 105 Each of
the programs set out in Agenda 21 details an estimated cost for
effective implementation. 10 6 Funding is needed for technical assis-
tance, for increasing the capacity of local and national govern-
ments, and to meet the start-up costs of facilities. 07 This mone-
standing through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge,
and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer
of technologies, including new and innovative technologies." Rio Decla-
ration, supra note 61, at 877.
100. The Berne Convention For The Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art. 2(1).
101. Id.
102. See generally Elliot Diringer, SAN FRANcIScO CHRONICLE, June
20, 1997.
103. See Susskind, supra note 68, at 41.
104. See Agenda 21, supra note 89, para. 33.13.
105. See Dernbach, supra note 84. This financial commitment was
consistent with the idea set out in Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration
which states that " [t] he special situation and needs of developing coun-
tries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally
vulnerable, shall be given special priority." Rio Declaration, supra note
61, at 877.
106. See id.
107. See id.
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tary assistance, if used wisely, could prevent environmental
problems that would cost an enormous amount to correct in the
future. 108
Unfortunately, the 0.7 goal has not been adhered to, especially
by the United States. The U.S. official development assistance to
other countries declined from 0.15 percent in 1993 to 0.10 per-
cent in 1995.109 In 1997, the U.S. was the lowest among all of the
developed nations in this category. 110 Developed countries on the
whole have reduced their aggregate contribution from 0.34 per-
cent in 1995 to 0.27 percent.1 ' Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
the Netherlands lead the group by contributing more than 0.7
percent of their GNP to other countries for development
assistance. 1
2
Agenda 21 provides little help in enforcing this provision. In
fact, the text of Agenda 21 may actually allow developed nations
to ignore the commitment. Specifically, the text calls for devel-
oped countries who have not reached the 0.7 target to only
make their best efforts to increase their level of official assis-
tance. 13 U.S. negotiators at Rio referred to this language when
they informed the press that the United States had not agreed to
the 0.7 percent target rate. 14
The developed world has failed to adhere to the commitments
of technological and scientific sharing established at Rio. More
importantly, developed nations have not followed through with
the financial goals set in Rio. As a result, many of the objectives
set for developing nations, including Mexico, India, and China,1 5
108. See id.
109. See Dernbach, supra note 84.
110. See id.
111. See U.N. GOAR, Programme for the Further Implementation
of Agenda 21 para. 18 (advanced unedited text, July 1, 1997).
112. See Dernbach, supra note 84.
113. See Agenda 21, supra note 89, para. 33.15.
114. See Dernbach, supra note 84. On the issue of financing sus-
tainable development, all nations agreed that additional resources were
needed, and that all available means should be utilized, including the
Global Environmental Facility of the World Bank. Contrary to the lan-
guage of the statute, the industrialized nations never agreed to commit
0.7% of their GNP to aid developing countries. See Edith Brown Weiss,
Introductory Note to United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, 31 I.L.M. 814, 815 (1992).
115. See generally World Leaders to Give Environment a Checkup, CHI.
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have been frustrated or stunted.
III. MEXICO'S RESPONSE TO THE AGENDA 21 COMMITMENTS
After Rio, in January of 1995, environmental officials from ten
Latin American countries met in Mexico City with representa-
tives from the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) to discuss the integration of Agenda 21's environmental
and economic goals into national policies in the region. 116 Hope
was high as participants recognized that market factors alone are
not enough to promote environmental protection."7 The parties
agreed that without comprehensive policies across several govern-
mental agencies, economic development would not be compati-
ble with environmental protection." 8 Secretary Julia Carabias
Lillo, head of SEMARNAP, commented that Mexico's approach
to Agenda 21 was to establish priorities and possibilities from a
socioeconomic viewpoint, 119 an area in which Agenda 21 offers
little assistance in.
In March of 1997, two years after the Latin American Environ-
mental Ministers met in Mexico and five years after Rio, these
priorities were still being searched for. Mexico did establish a
Secretariat for the issue, to allow for the implementation of laws,
the limitation of contamination in Mexico City, and the establish-
ment of the right of compensation for those affected by develop-
ment programs. 20 However, National Greenpeace representative,
Alejandro Calvillo stated that since the Rio meeting the processes
of environmental destruction have not slowed in Mexico.' 2' He
asserted that anti-ecological projects such as industrial waste
dumps were still being approved, while at the same time no lim-
SuN-TIMES, June 23, 1997, at 17.
116. See Latin American Environmental Ministers Meet in Mexico, ENV'T
WATCH LATIN AM., Feb. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ZEVI
File.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See IPS Correspondents, Latin America: "Rio Plus Five," the
NGO's Hour Has Come, INTER PRESS SERVICE, March 11, 1997, available in
1997 WL 7074129.
121. See id.
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its had been placed on motor vehicle use.122 Further, pollution in
the capital, Mexico City, had not improved.123 Calvillo summa-
rized the effectiveness of Agenda 21 in Mexico by saying that
only the fprmal aspects have been fulfilled - but in reality, Mex-
ico is still bad and overall evaluation is negative. 124
A report released by the UNEP, in February 1997, declared
that Latin America's environmental ruin was continuing at an
alarming pace. 125 It stated that almost half the region's grazing
areas have lost their ability to sustain animals or crops, and
about half of Latin America's mangrove swamps have been pol-
luted with agricultural pesticides. 26 Further, the report warned
that between 100,000 and 450,000 species of plants and animals
could disappear in the next forty years from the Latin American
region alone.1 27 Approximately eight out of ten people in Latin
America live in dense urban areas, where they breathe unhealthy
levels of air pollution. 128 Arsenio Rodriquez, a UNEP representa-
tive for Latin America, declared in a news conference that there
is neither the money nor the political will to stop the destruction
of the environment in Latin America. 129
In June of 1997, frustrated by the lack of financial assistance
and technological support by the developing nations, leaders of
Mexico and other Third World Nations refused to attend the
Earth Summit Plus Five held in New York. 130 Ambassador Daudi
Mwakawago of Tanzania spoke on behalf of 128 developing coun-
tries at the Earth Summit Plus Five: The benefits have not been
even. Those countries without the technology and infrastructure
have been marginalized even more.'3 ' In response, the U.S. Assis-
tant Secretary of State remarked that developing nations have to
122. See id.
123. See id
124. See id.
125. See Latin America Environment in Ruins, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
March 2, 1997, at 51A.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See World Leaders to Give Environment a Checkup, supra note 115.
131. See Elliot Diringer, SAN FRANcIsco CHRONICLE, June 20, 1997.
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be practical. There is never going to be the 0.7.132
Sixty leaders did meet in New York for a five-year review that
was not positive.' 33 Global annual emissions of carbon, which
contribute to the key greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, had risen
to 6.2 billion tons a year. 34 Fresh water was estimated to be in-
creasingly scarce, and the number of people living in absolute
poverty, on less than $1 a day, had risen above 1.1 billion. 135
In response to the world's continued depleting environmental
state, after Rio, President Clinton made a plea to developing na-
tions in November of 1997, to join us to meet the challenge. 136
In particular, President Clinton was referring to the challenge of
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the
year 2000.117 The nations present at the UNCED in Rio agreed to
take voluntary steps to achieve this goal, but shortly thereafter
130 developing countries, including Mexico, China, and India,
were exempted from having to reduce their emissions, although
they account for 40% of the emissions presently in the atmos-
phere. 38 This exemption was in response to the constant eco-
nomic instability of many developing nations, as well as the un-
realistic goal of achieving such a reduction in emissions, while
still developing a prosperous economy. The developing nations
refused President Clinton's plea. They argued that they should
not be required to reduce their emissions, since they were not
responsible for the high level of carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere for the past two centuries. 39
In November of 1997, the U.N. appointed a committee to re-
view the implementation and recommendations of the UNCED
and Agenda 21.140 During this committee review, Mexico claimed
132. See id.
133. See World Leaders to Give Environment a Checkup, supra note 115.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Ronald Bailey, Bill and Al's Global Warming Circus, FoRBES,
Nov. 3, 1997, at 346.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See UN: Sustainable development Commitments Must be Consolidated
and Acted Upon, Not Continually Redefined, M2 PREsswIRE, Nov. 7, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 15142868.
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that sustainable development commitments must be consolidated
and acted upon. 141 The Mexican representative argued that the
continual redefinition and adjustment of the plan needed to
end. 142 He stated that as international negotiations continued at
length about specific adjustments, several governmental bodies
did not even have a clear idea of sustainable development. Thus,
sustainable developmental measures were not being imple-
mented in these areas. 143
During the committee meeting, Agerico 0. Lancanlale, Of-
ficer-in-Charge of the New York Office of the United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization (UNIDO), heralded that
UNIDO was aimed at promoting economic growth, protecting
the environment, and creating employment opportunities. 144 He
further stated that sustainable development rested on industrial
development and environmental sustainability complementing
one another through appropriate technology, institutions, policy
framework, and market based incentives. 45 Unfortunately, as dis-
cussed in Part II, these appear to be the very goals that the UN-
CED is failing to achieve.
Mexico and several other developing nations, have been se-
verely frustrated by the slow moving, and at times stagnant, force
of the UNCED. The commitments are vast and impressive on pa-
per, but without the financial support from developing nations
or the sharing of technology,, the goals are unrealistic for Mexico
in its current state of economic vulnerability and sporadic
growth. In the final part that follows, alternatives for environ-
mental protection in Mexico and the developing world are
discussed.
IV. REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES FOR MEXICO AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
Against the backdrop of economic instability, environmental
regulation must fight an uphill battle in Mexico. A balance is re-
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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quired between environmental protection and Mexico's indus-
trial, urban, and developmental policies. 146 It is no surprise that
one of Mexico's top priorities is development, along with the
goal of decreasing poverty and leading Mexico toward the path
of becoming a world power. It seems both unfair and unrealistic
to deny Mexico the economic benefits that come with increased
consumption and increased development. It is, however, impor-
tant to note that as Mexico develops, it will increase its energy
consumption and its pollution.1 4 If adhered to, Agenda 21 could
help to promote efficient energy use and sustainable use of natu-
al resources, while not violating Mexico's national sovereignty.
In order to work, however, developed nations that are members
of Agenda 21 must adhere to the commitments made in Rio. Un-
til this occurs, Mexico and the developing world must find alter-
natives to protecting their environment while promoting their
development.
Increased trade may be one possible solution. Such an in-
crease in trade could lead to more investment in Mexico and in
turn create greater means for the promotion of environmental
enforcement.1 48 Further, economic growth could also advance en-
vironmental efficiency among industry in Mexico.1 49 Increased
trade alone is not a complete remedy to Mexico's environmental
degradation. Under a basic economic scheme, the cost of pollu-
tion prevention must be less than the cost of polluting, or it
would not be economically beneficial to use preventive materials.
To achieve this lower cost, vast amounts of funds cannot be spent
on researching pollution control technology. Thus, Mexico is
forced to look to developed nations for assistance in sharing
their already advanced technology.
A second alternative would be environmental audits, with
which Mexico has already succeeded in creating incentives for
private environmental compliance.1 50 Environmental audits in-
146. See Garcia et al., supra note 57, at 219.
147. See id.
148. See Questions and Answers about the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 1991 National Trade Data Bank, available in LEXIS,
Intlaw, AM.
149. See id.
150. SeeJuan Francisco Torres-Landa et al., Mexican Law, 31 INT'L
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volve a procedure initiated by a private party and carried out
under the supervision of the Mexican Federal Environmental
Protection Agency. 5' The company volunteers its violations and
is evaluated to determine the actions needed to achieve compli-
ance over a period of time with pre-approved budgets and dead-
lines. 5 ' The result of the audit binds the party to perform the
requisite corrective action with the incentive that they will not be
sanctioned for those matters covered by the audit.153
There are obstacles to implementing an environmental audit-
ing system. Audits, especially when comprehensive are extremely
expensive.1 54 Further, an industry may be hesitant to make an au-
dit out of fear that it could be used against them. For example,
an audit may reveal that a company committed a violation result-
ing in civil or criminal sanctions, and the audit may be used
against them in an enforcement proceeding or a citizen suit.'
55
An audit may also bring forward potential plaintiffs in an envi-
ronmental tort action or reveal trade secrets to competitors. 56 To
remedy this potential problem, Mexico may look to follow the
lead of the United States and consider granting immunity to
companies that voluntarily disclose their violations.15
In light of the possible drawbacks, the Mexican Environmental
Protection Agency has provided three reasons for promoting the
Environmental Audit System. 5 ' First, private companies are given
LAw. 535 (1997).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Miri Berlin, Environmental Auditing: Entering the Eco-
Information Highway, 6 N.YU. ENVTL. Lj. 618, 622 (1998).
155. See id.
156. See id. (explaining that in the United States, proposals for evi-
dentiary privileges and enforcement leniency have attempted to ad-
dress these concerns).
157. See Steven P. Solow, Audit Privilege and Immunity Legislation and
the Department of Justice: Policy on Voluntary Disclosure, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY, STUDY OUTLINE, SD19 ALI-ABA 21, 25 (September 17, 1998) (ex-
plaining that in recent years bills have been presented in the United
States Congress proposing that immunity be granted to facilities that
disclose their violations).
158. See Mexican Law, supra note 150, at 535.
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incentives to come forward with their environmental violations
and to reach economically efficient solutions that can be imple-
mented over time to remedy the existing problems. 159 Second,
the audits create a system in which the private party allocates the
resources necessary for environmental compliance. 60 Through
this mechanism, the budget of the Environmental Protection
Agency can be focused on industries that must still be subject to
inspections and sanctions.' 6' Finally, the audit system may in-
crease the levels of compliance by setting out examples that
other industries may follow. 62 Thus, the audit system creates a
device whereby industries can meet the applicable environmental
regulations without facing initial disciplinary measures. 163
Mexico can also enforce its environmental program through
public right-to-know laws and through labeling potentially harm-
ful environmental products, also called eco-labeling. These laws
could create increased public awareness about the environmental
harms of products. Furthermore, these laws may lead to public
pressure on industries to reduce pollution and comply with na-
tional regulations. However, this method has the potential of be-
ing a double-edged sword. Strict labeling requirements on prod-
ucts might lead to restrictive business practices in developing
countries and thus further limit access to markets 64 In many de-
veloping nations, such as Mexico, producers lacking financial re-
sources oppose strict labeling requirements for fear of being un-
able to compete in the global market. 65
There is some indication that eco-labeling is effective in com-
bating environmental degradation. In Germany, the labeling of
low-emissions oil and gas heating appliances reduced the quanti-
ties of sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen oxides emit-
159. See id.
160. See id. at 536.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 537.
164. See Kristin Dawkins, Ecolabelling: Consumer Right-to-Know or Re-
strictive Business Practice?, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: Eco-
NOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE MEANS? 501, 503 (Rfidiger Wolfrum ed.,
1996).
165. See id. at 544.
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ted by thirty percent. 166 The labeling of low-solvent paints and
varnishes increased the market share of the products from one
percent to fifty percent, which in turn reduced the amount of
solvent released into the environment by 40,000 tons. 67
One suggestion that addresses the fears of the developing na-
tions that their trade will be restricted is to set up a system of
credit among the nations that produce goods and those that
consume goods. 6 For example, Mexico, an exporter of coffee,
could negotiate an international commodity agreement with a
major importer of coffee, such as the United States. Under this
agreement, the two nations finance the transition to sustainable
commodity production. Mexico would gradually comply with
stricter environmental standards for processing and production
in exchange for preferential access to the importer's market. 69
This basic method of providing credit could ensure market ac-
cess for developing countries, while at the same time promoting
greater competition. 70
A final way Mexico can confront their environmental agenda
without the support of the developed nations is through educa-
tion. Juan Jose Gonzalez Marques, Regional Advisor to Mexico
from the UNEP, discussed such an alternative at a symposium at
the University of Texas at Austin in 1996.171 Marques commented
that Mexico's main problem was not lack of laws, but rather lack
of enforcement by administrators, prosecutors, and judges. 72 He
further explained that this lack of enforcement created a need
166. See id. at 540 (citing R.V. Hartwell and L. Bergkamp, Eco-
labeling in Europe: New Market-Related Environmental Risks?, BNA INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAILY, October 20, 1992.)
167. See id.
168. See id. at 546.
169. See id. (citing H.L.M. Cox, International Agreements to Deal with
Environmental Externalities of Primary Commodity Exports, Paper presented
to the European Parliament's conference on Striking a Green Deal: Eu-
rope's Role in Environment and South-North Trade Relations, Brussels,
Belgium, November 7-9, 1993.)
170. See Dawkins, supra note 164, at 546.
171. See Roger W. Findley, Symposium: Sustainable Development in
Latin American Rainforests and the Role of Law, 32 TEX. INT'L LJ. 1, 4
(1997).
172. See id.
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for implementing new environmental law courses in law schools
and instructing judges on environmental laws and regulations."3
Continuing education programs for attorneys, which update
practitioners on trends in the field of environmental law, may
also be beneficial. Finally, Mexico may consider subsidies, from
the Mexican government or from private industries, to fund in-
creased environmental law educational programs.
CONCLUSION
Mexico has exemplified its commitment to the environment by
adopting domestic environmental law. Mexico has realized that
any improvement in the global environment will only be
achieved through a global commitment. Although Mexico has
pledged its dedication to the environmental agenda, the needs
of its vulnerable economy are frequently at odds with its environ-
mental goals. Agenda 21 provides a strong and thorough frame-
work for achieving a global environmental commitment while
still preserving and nurturing the growth of the Mexican econ-
omy. For the plan to work, however, there must be a commit-
ment not only from Mexico, but also from the developed nations
of the world to share technology and to help fund the environ-
mental efforts of the developing world. Thus far, this commit-
ment has been slow in coming.
Until the industrialized nations realize that their continued
growth depends on a healthy and prosperous global environ-
ment, achievable through the Agenda 21 commitments, Mexico
must continue to regulate its environmental situation on its own
while balancing the needs of its ever fluctuating economy.
173. See id.
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